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- Key Findings 主要发现
- Introduction 介绍
- Tracking the Global Decline
追踪全球衰退 - The Shattering of the Global Internet
全球互联网的崩溃 - A Resilient Internet for a More Democratic Future
一个有弹性的互联网，一个更加民主的未来
Written by 撰写者
Adrian Shahbaz 阿德里安·沙巴兹
Allie Funk 艾莉·芬克
Kian Vesteinsson 基安·韦斯坦森
Key Findings 主要发现
Global internet freedom declined for the 12th consecutive year. The sharpest downgrades were documented in Russia, Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya. Following the Russian military’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin dramatically intensified its ongoing efforts to suppress domestic dissent and accelerated the closure or exile of the country’s remaining independent media outlets. In at least 53 countries, users faced legal repercussions for expressing themselves online, often leading to draconian prison terms.
全球互联网自由度连续 12 年下降。 俄罗斯、缅甸、苏丹和利比亚的评级下调幅度最大。在俄罗斯军队无端非法入侵乌克兰后，克里姆林宫大幅加强了镇压国内异议的力度，并加速关闭或流放该国剩余的独立媒体机构。在至少 53 个国家，用户因在网上表达自己的观点而面临法律后果，常常导致严厉的监禁。
Governments are breaking apart the global internet to create more controllable online spaces. A record number of national governments blocked websites with nonviolent political, social, or religious content, undermining the rights to free expression and access to information. A majority of these blocks targeted sources located outside of the country. New national laws posed an additional threat to the free flow of information by centralizing technical infrastructure and applying flawed regulations to social media platforms and user data. **各国政府正在打破全球互联网，以创建更可控的在线空间。**数量创纪录的国家政府封锁了含有非暴力政治、社会或宗教内容的网站，损害了言论自由和获取信息的权利。这些封锁中的大多数都针对位于该国境外的来源。新的国家法律通过集中技术基础设施并对社交媒体平台和用户数据应用有缺陷的法规，对信息的自由流动构成了额外的威胁。
China was the world’s worst environment for internet freedom for the eighth consecutive year. Censorship intensified during the 2022 Beijing Olympics and after tennis star Peng Shuai accused a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official of sexual assault. The government continued to tighten its control over the country’s booming technology sector, including through new rules that require platforms to use their algorithmic systems to promote CCP ideology.
中国连续第八年成为全球互联网自由环境最差的国家。 2022 年北京奥运会期间，网球明星彭帅指控一名中共高级官员性侵后，审查制度进一步加强。政府继续加强对国家蓬勃发展的科技行业的控制，包括通过新规则要求平台使用其算法系统来宣传中共意识形态。
A record 26 countries experienced internet freedom improvements. Despite the overall global decline, civil society organizations in many countries have driven collaborative efforts to improve legislation, develop media resilience, and ensure accountability among technology companies. Successful collective actions against internet shutdowns offered a model for further progress on other problems like commercial spyware. **创纪录的 26 个国家的互联网自由度得到改善。**尽管全球整体下滑，但许多国家的民间社会组织仍在推动合作努力，以改善立法、增强媒体复原力并确保科技公司的问责制。针对互联网关闭的成功集体行动为解决商业间谍软件等其他问题提供了一个进一步取得进展的模式。
Internet freedom in the United States improved marginally for the first time in six years. There were fewer reported cases of targeted surveillance and online harassment during protests compared with the previous year, and the country now ranks ninth globally, tied with Australia and France. The United States still lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law, and policymakers made little progress on the passage of other legislation related to internet freedom. Ahead of the November 2022 midterm elections, the online environment was riddled with political disinformation, conspiracy theories, and online harassment aimed at election workers and officials.
美国的互联网自由度六年来首次略有改善。 与去年相比，抗议期间发生的针对性监控和网络骚扰案件有所减少，该国目前在全球排名第九，与澳大利亚和法国并列。美国仍然缺乏全面的联邦隐私法，政策制定者在通过与互联网自由相关的其他立法方面进展甚微。在 2022 年 11 月中期选举之前，网络环境充斥着针对选举工作人员和官员的政治虚假信息、阴谋论和网络骚扰。
Human rights hang in the balance amid a competition to control the web. Authoritarian states are vying to propagate their model of digital control around the world. In response, a coalition of democratic governments has increased the promotion of online human rights at multilateral forums, outlining a positive vision for the internet. However, their progress remains hampered by problematic internet freedom practices in their own countries.
在网络控制权的竞争中，人权悬而未决。 独裁国家正在竞相在全世界传播他们的数字控制模式。作为回应，民主政府联盟在多边论坛上加大了对网络人权的促进力度，勾勒出互联网的积极愿景。然而，他们的进步仍然受到本国存在问题的互联网自由做法的阻碍。
Introduction 介绍
At home and on the international stage, authoritarians are on a campaign to divide the open internet into a patchwork of repressive enclaves. More governments than ever are exerting control over what people can access and share online by blocking foreign websites, hoarding personal data, and centralizing their countries’ technical infrastructure. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom has declined for a 12th consecutive year.
在国内和国际舞台上，独裁者正在开展一场运动，将开放的互联网分割成一个拼凑而成的压制性飞地。越来越多的政府通过封锁外国网站、囤积个人数据以及集中本国的技术基础设施来控制人们在线访问和共享的内容。由于这些趋势，全球互联网自由度已连续 12 年下降。
Rising digital repression in many countries mirrored broader crackdowns on human rights over the past year. Nowhere was this clearer than in Russia, Myanmar, Libya, and Sudan, which experienced the world’s steepest declines in internet freedom. Online censorship reached an all-time high, with a record number of governments blocking political, social, or religious content, often targeting information sources based outside of their borders. More than three-quarters of the world’s internet users now live in countries where authorities punish people for exercising their right to free expression online.
许多国家不断加剧的数字压制反映出过去一年对人权的更广泛镇压。这一点在俄罗斯、缅甸、利比亚和苏丹最为明显，这些国家的互联网自由度经历了全球最大幅度的下滑。在线审查达到历史最高水平，封锁政治、社会或宗教内容的政府数量创历史新高，通常针对境外信息源。目前，世界上超过四分之三的互联网用户生活在当局惩罚人们行使在线言论自由权的国家。
Alarmingly, these antidemocratic abuses are not the only factor behind the splintering of the internet into national segments. Some governments are clearly cultivating a domestic digital space where state-endorsed narratives dominate and independent media, civil society, and already marginalized voices are more easily suppressed. But others are inadvertently contributing to country-based barriers through their efforts to tackle disinformation, protect user data, and deter genuine cybercrimes. Whatever the intention, however, the growing fragmentation of the internet comes with serious consequences for fundamental rights including freedom of expression, access to information, and privacy, particularly for people living under authoritarian regimes or in backsliding democracies.
令人震惊的是，这些反民主的滥用行为并不是互联网分裂成国家部分的唯一因素。一些政府显然正在培育一个国内数字空间，在这个空间中，国家认可的叙事占主导地位，独立媒体、公民社会和已经边缘化的声音更容易受到压制。但其他人通过努力解决虚假信息、保护用户数据和阻止真正的网络犯罪，无意中助长了基于国家的障碍。然而，无论意图如何，互联网的日益碎片化都会对言论自由、信息获取和隐私等基本权利带来严重后果，特别是对于生活在独裁政权或民主倒退的人们来说。
**A more fragmented internet
互联网更加碎片化**
The internet has always been subject to some degree of fracturing along national borders, but increased state intervention in the last year has dramatically accelerated the process. This report identifies three main causes of fragmentation, all of which contributed to declining respect for human rights online: restrictions on the flow of news and information, centralized state control over internet infrastructure, and barriers to cross-border transfers of user data.
互联网一直在国界上受到某种程度的分裂，但去年国家干预力度的加大极大地加速了这一过程。该报告指出了碎片化的三个主要原因，所有这些原因都导致了对网络人权的尊重下降：新闻和信息流动的限制、国家对互联网基础设施的集中控制以及用户数据跨境传输的障碍。
While the physical network of the global internet remains intact, a growing number of users only have access to an online space that mirrors the views of their government and its interests. Authorities in 47 of the 70 countries covered by Freedom on the Net have limited users’ access to information sources located outside of their borders. Virtually all of these restrictions constitute clear infringements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which codifies the right “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In most cases, entrenched and aspiring authoritarian leaders sought to contain online dissent by preventing residents from reaching information sources based in countries with a greater level of media freedom.
尽管全球互联网的物理网络保持完好，但越来越多的用户只能访问反映其政府及其利益观点的在线空间。 Freedom on the Net 覆盖的 70 个国家中，有 47 个国家的当局限制用户访问其境外的信息源。事实上，所有这些限制都明显违反了《世界人权宣言》，该宣言规定了“通过任何媒体、不分国界寻求、接受和传播信息和思想”的权利。在大多数情况下，根深蒂固且雄心勃勃的独裁领导人试图通过阻止居民接触媒体自由度较高的国家的信息来源来遏制网上异议。
Entrenched and aspiring authoritarian leaders sought to contain online dissent by preventing residents from reaching global information sources. 根深蒂固且雄心勃勃的独裁领导人试图通过阻止居民接触全球信息来源来遏制网上异议。
This increasing fragmentation is part of a global, multifaceted competition for control over the digital sphere. For most of the period since the internet’s inception, representatives of the private sector, civil society, and the technical community have participated in a consensus-driven process to harmonize security standards and technical protocols. This has resulted in a decentralized infrastructure that speaks a common language, enabling users to communicate with one another and access information regardless of location. Authoritarian powers have long sought to displace this multistakeholder model of internet governance with one that promotes cyber sovereignty, or greater control by states. Diplomats from China and Russia have made inroads at institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), seeking to transform the United Nations agency into a global internet regulator that advances authoritarian interests. Doing so would fundamentally alter the open internet, preventing billions of people from communicating with one another and accessing life-changing resources without explicit permission from their governments.
这种日益加剧的碎片化是全球性、多方面的数字领域控制权竞争的一部分。自互联网诞生以来的大部分时间里，私营部门、民间社会和技术界的代表都参与了共识驱动的进程，以协调安全标准和技术协议。这形成了一种使用通用语言的去中心化基础设施，使用户无论身在何处都可以相互交流并访问信息。威权国家长期以来一直寻求以促进网络主权或国家加强控制的模式取代这种多利益相关者的互联网治理模式。中国和俄罗斯的外交官已进入国际电信联盟（ITU）等机构，寻求将联合国机构转变为促进独裁利益的全球互联网监管机构。这样做将从根本上改变开放的互联网，阻止数十亿人在未经政府明确许可的情况下相互交流并获取改变生活的资源。
A cohort of democracies are pushing back. Having previously focused on a narrower set of economic and security interests linked to countering Beijing, the United States has more recently shown promising signs of reengagement in cyber diplomacy with the aim of promoting a positive vision of democracy in the digital age. The European Union (EU) has also moved forward with innovative and rights-respecting regulatory approaches to address harms that have been exacerbated by the internet. But many democracies have yet to significantly improve respect for online rights within their own borders. Of the 35 countries covered by this report that participated in the US-hosted Summit for Democracy, 13 experienced an internet freedom decline over the past year, as did 10 of the 18 Freedom on the Net countries that signed the US-led Declaration for the Future of the Internet. By adopting flawed policies at home, democracies risk undermining the very values they seek to defend abroad, while potentially cutting off residents of authoritarian countries from a freer and more open internet.
一群民主国家正在反击。美国此前专注于与对抗北京相关的狭隘经济和安全利益，最近显示出重新参与网络外交的有希望的迹象，旨在促进数字时代民主的积极愿景。欧盟 (EU) 也采取了创新和尊重权利的监管方法，以解决因互联网而加剧的危害。但许多民主国家尚未在本国境内显着提高对网络权利的尊重。在本报告涵盖的参加美国主办的民主峰会的 35 个国家中，有 13 个国家在过去一年中经历了互联网自由度的下降，签署美国主导的网络自由宣言的 18 个国家中的 10 个国家也是如此。互联网的未来。通过在国内采取有缺陷的政策，民主国家可能会破坏它们在国外寻求捍卫的价值观，同时可能会切断威权国家居民与更自由、更开放的互联网的联系。
**Protecting human rights online through democratic resilience
通过民主复原力保护在线人权**
The technologies associated with the global internet have fostered connections and common interests among different people and communities, facilitated more transparent and participatory governance, and brought tremendous direct and indirect economic benefits. However, the rapid digitization of media and communication has also generated new opportunities for manipulation, extremism, and repression. Policymakers have been too slow in addressing the hazards that accompany technological change, and their emphasis on state-level digital threats—grouped under terms such as information war, cyberwar, and trade war—has often elevated national security and economic considerations over the fundamental rights of individuals. The reality is that economic and security interests are directly linked to respect for individual rights.
与全球互联网相关的技术促进了不同人群和社区之间的联系和共同利益，促进了更加透明和参与性的治理，并带来了巨大的直接和间接经济效益。然而，媒体和通信的快速数字化也为操纵、极端主义和镇压创造了新的机会。政策制定者在解决技术变革带来的危害方面行动过于缓慢，而且他们对国家级数字威胁（信息战、网络战和贸易战等术语的分类）的重视往往将国家安全和经济考虑置于基本权利之上的个人。现实情况是，经济和安全利益与尊重个人权利直接相关。
Lasting solutions to disinformation, online harassment, and other harms presented by digital tools are unlikely to be achieved through a fragmentation of the internet. Simply imposing strict national laws onto a global information system is bound to be ineffective. Beijing’s efforts to build and maintain a Great Firewall, for example, have done little to address societal concerns about privacy, cybersecurity, corporate malfeasance, false content, and abusive online behavior. It may be difficult to prevent Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran from persisting in their efforts to isolate their populations, but there remains an opportunity to convince many less repressive states that an open internet is in their best interest.
通过互联网的碎片化，不可能持久解决数字工具带来的虚假信息、在线骚扰和其他危害。简单地将严格的国家法律强加于全球信息系统注定是无效的。例如，北京建立和维护防火墙的努力并没有解决社会对隐私、网络安全、企业渎职、虚假内容和滥用网络行为的担忧。也许很难阻止北京、莫斯科和德黑兰坚持隔离本国民众，但仍然有机会让许多不那么专制的国家相信开放的互联网符合他们的最佳利益。
Greater focus should be placed on developing political and societal resilience in the face of these harms. Already, journalists, human rights defenders, and advocacy organizations have been at the forefront of many recent successes that strengthened democratic resilience in the digital sphere. Broad coalitions have bolstered international norms against internet shutdowns, which occurred in fewer countries over the past year. Collaborative investigations into the purveyors of surveillance software have resulted in growing awareness of an underregulated industry that continues to target state officials, journalists, activists, and members of diaspora communities. Whistleblowers have done the public a great service by exposing the inadequacies and failures of influential technology companies.
面对这些危害，应更加注重发展政治和社会复原力。记者、人权维护者和倡导组织已经站在最近许多成功的最前沿，这些成功加强了数字领域的民主弹性。广泛的联盟加强了反对互联网关闭的国际规范，过去一年中发生互联网关闭的国家较少。对监控软件供应商的合作调查使人们越来越意识到这个监管不足的行业，该行业继续针对国家官员、记者、活动人士和侨民社区成员。举报人通过揭露有影响力的科技公司的不足和失败，为公众提供了巨大的服务。
Democratic leaders should recommit to preserving the benefits of a free and open internet. True resilience requires new regulations that enshrine protections for human rights in the digital age, stronger multilateral coordination on cybercrime and corporate accountability, and deeper investment in civil society, which so often drives collective action to defend internet freedom and resist digital authoritarianism.
民主党领导人应重新致力于维护自由开放互联网的好处。真正的韧性需要制定新的法规来保护数字时代的人权，加强对网络犯罪和企业问责的多边协调，以及对民间社会的更深入的投资，而这往往会推动集体行动来捍卫互联网自由和抵制数字威权主义。
Tracking the Global Decline
追踪全球衰退
*A rundown of prominent changes to countries’ internet freedom scores
各国互联网自由度得分显着变化一览 *
Global internet freedom has declined for the 12th consecutive year. The environment for human rights online deteriorated in 28 countries, though 26 countries registered net gains—the largest number of improvements since the inception of the project. The sharpest decline occurred in Russia, followed by Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya, while The Gambia and Zimbabwe experienced major improvements. The United States ranked ninth overall, and Iceland was once again the top performer. For the eighth consecutive year, China was found to have the worst conditions for internet freedom.
全球互联网自由度连续 12 年下降。 28 个国家的网络人权环境恶化，但有 26 个国家取得了净收益——这是该项目启动以来改善数量最多的国家。下降幅度最大的是俄罗斯，其次是缅甸、苏丹和利比亚，而冈比亚和津巴布韦则出现了重大改善。美国总体排名第九，冰岛再次位居榜首。中国连续第八年被评为互联网自由条件最差的国家。
Freedom on the Net is an annual study of human rights in the digital sphere. The project assesses internet freedom in 70 countries, accounting for 89 percent of the world’s internet users. This report, the 12th in its series, covered developments between June 2021 and May 2022. More than 80 analysts and advisers contributed to this year’s edition, using a standard methodology to determine each country’s internet freedom score on a 100-point scale, with 21 separate indicators pertaining to obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. The Freedom on the Net website features in-depth reports and data on each country’s conditions, as well as policy recommendations for governments and tech companies. 《网络自由》 是对数字领域人权的年度研究。该项目评估了 70 个国家的互联网自由度，这些国家占全球互联网用户的 89%。该报告是该系列的第 12 份报告，涵盖了 2021 年 6 月至 2022 年 5 月期间的发展情况。超过 80 名分析师和顾问为今年的报告做出了贡献，他们使用标准 方法 以 100 分制确定每个国家的互联网自由得分，其中 21 有关访问障碍、内容限制和侵犯用户权利的单独指标。网络自由网站提供有关每个国家情况的深入报告和数据，以及针对政府和科技公司的 政策建议。
**The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine puts internet freedom under threat
克里姆林宫入侵乌克兰使互联网自由受到威胁**
Internet freedom in Russia declined by seven points in the period surrounding the government’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, reaching an all-time low and representing this year’s largest national decline in Freedom on the Net. Within weeks of the invasion, the Kremlin blocked Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, depriving Russians of access to reliable information about the war and limiting their ability to connect with users in other countries. The government also blocked more than 5,000 websites, compelled media outlets to refer to the invasion as a “special military operation,” and introduced a law prescribing up to 15 years in prison for those who spread “false information” about the conflict. The regime’s increasing restrictions, both before and after the invasion was launched, significantly raised the risks associated with online activism and hastened the closure or exile of the country’s remaining independent media outlets.
在 2022 年 2 月政府残酷入侵乌克兰期间，俄罗斯 的互联网自由度下降了 7 个百分点，达到历史最低点，是今年全国网络自由度下降幅度最大的一次。入侵发生后几周内，克里姆林宫封锁了 Facebook、Instagram 和 Twitter，剥夺了俄罗斯人获取有关战争的可靠信息的权利，并限制了他们与其他国家用户联系的能力。政府还封锁了 5000 多个网站，迫使媒体将这次入侵称为“特别军事行动”，并制定了一项法律，规定传播有关冲突“虚假信息”的人最高可被判处 15 年监禁。该政权在入侵之前和之后不断加大限制，大大增加了与网络活动相关的风险，并加速了该国剩余独立媒体机构的关闭或流放。
Internet freedom in Russia reached an all-time low following the government’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. 在政府残酷入侵乌克兰后，俄罗斯的互联网自由度跌至历史最低点。
The Russian military’s actions in Ukraine also undermined that country’s internet freedom. In the southern city of Kherson, Russian troops forced service providers to reroute internet traffic through Russian networks during the spring and summer of 2022, leaving Ukrainian users without access to major social media platforms and a plethora of Ukrainian and international news sites. Though online media outlets have bravely continued to cover the invasion, their reporters faced great danger while carrying out their work. Several journalists affiliated with such websites were killed by Russian forces.
俄罗斯军方在 乌克兰 的行动也破坏了该国的互联网自由。在南部城市赫尔松，俄罗斯军队迫使服务提供商在 2022 年春季和夏季通过俄罗斯网络重新路由互联网流量，导致乌克兰用户无法访问主要社交媒体平台以及大量乌克兰和国际新闻网站。尽管网络媒体勇敢地继续报道入侵事件，但他们的记者在开展工作时面临着巨大的危险。与此类网站有联系的几名记者被俄罗斯军队杀害。
The Ukrainian government and people have shown astonishing resilience during the invasion. Government officials and telecommunications companies worked together to repair internet infrastructure and ensure access to online resources and information, which can be life-saving in the midst of an armed conflict. Some 11,000 Starlink stations were deployed to provide satellite-based internet service as part of a collaboration involving the government, the US technology firm SpaceX, and other partners. Ukrainian telecom operators also enabled users to switch between carriers when their primary carrier’s signal was unavailable, and they undertook major efforts to deliver Wi-Fi access to bomb shelters. Immediately after Russian forces invaded the country, the Ukrainian company Ajax Systems collaborated with the government to launch a mobile application—downloaded more than four million times as of March—that alerts users about incoming air raids.
乌克兰政府和人民在入侵期间表现出了惊人的韧性。政府官员和电信公司共同努力修复互联网基础设施并确保在线资源和信息的访问，这在武装冲突中可以挽救生命。作为政府、美国科技公司 SpaceX 和其他合作伙伴合作的一部分，部署了约 11,000 个星链站来提供基于卫星的互联网服务。乌克兰电信运营商还允许用户在主要运营商的信号不可用时在运营商之间进行切换，并且他们做出了重大努力，为防空洞提供 Wi-Fi 接入。俄罗斯军队入侵该国后，乌克兰公司 Ajax Systems 立即与政府合作推出了一款移动应用程序（截至 3 月份下载量已超过 400 万次），用于提醒用户即将到来的空袭。
**Coups and elections drive major declines and improvements
政变和选举推动经济大幅下滑和改善**
Internet freedom declined by five points in Myanmar, contributing to a precipitous 19-point decline over the past two years. The country now hosts the second worst environment for human rights online, outperforming only China. Since the military junta seized power from an elected civilian government in February 2021, it has cemented its censorship regime, blocking all but 1,200 websites, restricting access to major social media platforms, and imposing local internet shutdowns. The few online resources that remained accessible during the year were dominated by promilitary voices, and activists, journalists, and ordinary users continued to be forcibly disappeared, detained, and tortured. The junta compelled the Norwegian service provider Telenor to sell its operations in the country to a military-aligned company, fully consolidating its control over the telecommunications sector.
缅甸 的互联网自由度下降了 5 个百分点，导致过去两年急剧下降 19 个百分点。该国目前的网络人权环境排名第二，仅次于中国。自 2021 年 2 月军政府从民选文职政府手中夺取权力以来，它巩固了审查制度，封锁了除 1,200 个网站之外的所有网站，限制对主要社交媒体平台的访问，并强制关闭当地互联网。这一年中仍可访问的少数在线资源主要由亲军方的声音主导，活动人士、记者和普通用户继续被强行失踪、拘留和酷刑。军政府迫使挪威服务提供商 Telenor 将其在该国的业务出售给一家与军方结盟的公司，从而全面巩固了其对电信行业的控制。
Sudan’s score fell by four points after military leaders staged a coup and dissolved the country’s transitional government in October 2021, marking a devastating setback for Sudanese democracy. The military voided articles of the interim constitution that protected fundamental rights and declared a state of emergency that lasted until May 2022. As Sudanese civilians mobilized mass protests in response, authorities restricted internet connectivity, blocked social media platforms, and assaulted and arrested journalists.
2021 年 10 月军事领导人发动政变并解散苏丹过渡政府后，苏丹的 得分下降了 4 分，标志着苏丹民主的毁灭性挫折。军方废除了临时宪法中保护基本权利的条款，并宣布进入持续到 2022 年 5 月的紧急状态。作为回应，苏丹平民动员了大规模抗议活动，当局限制了互联网连接，封锁了社交媒体平台，并袭击和逮捕了记者。
Internet freedom in Nicaragua dropped by three points amid an election in November 2021 that featured a harsh clampdown on opposition leaders, dissidents, and independent journalists. Repressive legislation such as the Cybercrime Law paved the way for increased self-censorship and lengthy prison sentences against critical users.
尼加拉瓜 的互联网自由度在 2021 年 11 月的选举中下降了 3 个百分点，这次选举对反对派领导人、持不同政见者和独立记者进行了严厉镇压。 《网络犯罪法》等压制性立法为加强自我审查和针对关键用户的长期监禁铺平了道路。
In Hungary, the status of internet freedom declined from Free to Partly Free, mirroring the country’s broader democratic decline under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. During opposition primary elections in September and October 2021, in which voters chose candidates to challenge Orbán and his ruling party, cyberattacks from unknown sources plagued electronic voting systems and independent news outlets in the country. Election organizers were forced to suspend voting after their computer system suffered an attack, and independent news sites were taken offline before the announcement of electoral results. Months earlier in July, an investigation revealed that at least three journalists had been targeted with Pegasus, an infamous spyware tool developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group.
在 匈牙利，互联网自由的状况从自由下降到部分自由，反映了该国在总理维克托·欧尔班领导下的更广泛的民主衰落。在 2021 年 9 月和 10 月的反对派初选期间，选民选择候选人挑战欧尔班及其执政党，来自不明来源的网络攻击困扰着该国的电子投票系统和独立新闻媒体。选举组织者的计算机系统遭受攻击后被迫暂停投票，独立新闻网站在选举结果公布前被关闭。几个月前的 7 月，一项调查显示，至少三名记者成为 Pegasus 的攻击目标，Pegasus 是以色列公司 NSO Group 开发的臭名昭著的间谍软件工具。
In The Gambia, internet freedom improved by three points, contributing to a 23-point improvement since the end of former president Yahya Jammeh’s repressive regime in 2017. Gambians mobilized online without restriction during the December 2021 presidential election, in which incumbent Adama Barrow secured a second term. The Barrow administration also passed a landmark law guaranteeing the right to public information, an important step for transparency and accountability.
在冈比亚，互联网自由度提高了 3 个百分点，自 2017 年结束前总统叶海亚·贾梅 (Yahya Jammeh) 的专制政权以来，进步了 23 个百分点。冈比亚人在 2021 年 12 月的总统选举期间不受限制地在网上动员起来，现任总统阿达马·巴罗 (Adama Barrow) 获得了第二学期。巴罗政府还通过了一项具有里程碑意义的法律，保障公众信息权，这是透明度和问责制的重要一步。
**New and persistent threats to free expression worldwide
全球言论自由面临新的和持续的威胁**
Freedom on the Net found that officials in at least 53 countries charged, arrested, or imprisoned internet users in retaliation for posts about political or social causes. In Libya, which suffered this year’s third-largest score decline alongside Sudan, users who shared criminal commentary or reporting online have been forcibly disappeared before reemerging in detention. Rwandan authorities sentenced a YouTube commentator whose videos criticized the government to 15 years in prison in September 2021. 网络自由发现，至少 53 个国家的官员对互联网用户提出指控、逮捕或监禁，以报复发布有关政治或社会事业的帖子。在 利比亚，与苏丹一样，今年分数下降幅度第三大，在网上分享犯罪评论或报道的用户在重新被拘留之前已被强行失踪。 2021 年 9 月，卢旺达 当局判处一名在视频中批评政府的 YouTube 评论员 15 年监禁。
Authorities in at least 40 countries blocked social, political, or religious content online, an all-time high in Freedom on the Net. Internet users in Jordan reported that the website of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists was briefly blocked in October 2021, after the organization published leaked financial documents that exposed the secret wealth of the country’s king and other world leaders. In Belarus, authorities blocked the websites of civil society organizations throughout the coverage period, part of a wholescale assault on the groups that included raids, arrests, and forced closures.
至少 40 个国家/地区的当局封锁了网上的社会、政治或宗教内容，这是网络自由度的历史最高水平。约旦 互联网用户报告称，国际调查记者联盟的网站于 2021 年 10 月被短暂封锁，此前该组织发布了泄露的财务文件，揭露了该国国王和其他世界领导人的秘密财富。在 白俄罗斯，当局在整个报道期间封锁了民间社会组织的网站，这是对这些组织进行全面攻击的一部分，包括突袭、逮捕和强制关闭。
In at least 22 countries, government officials blocked access to social media or communications platforms. Some blocks were imposed to coerce the companies into compliance with requirements that they open in-country offices, store data within the country, or otherwise change their operations in ways that facilitate enforcement of government censorship or data requests. In Uzbekistan, authorities blocked a range of international social media and messaging apps in July and November 2021 on the grounds that they failed to comply with localization requirements in a data protection law; access to most platforms was restored by August 2022. In March 2022, a judge on Brazil’s Supreme Court reversed an order that would have banned Telegram, after the app agreed to remove content that was flagged as disinformation and announced that it would appoint a local representative. Nigerian officials rescinded a seven-month block on Twitter in January 2022, claiming that the company had agreed to establish a physical presence in the country.
在至少 22 个国家，政府官员封锁了社交媒体或通讯平台。实施一些封锁是为了迫使公司遵守在国内开设办事处、在国内存储数据或以其他方式改变其运营方式以促进政府审查或数据请求的实施的要求。在 乌兹别克斯坦，当局于 2021 年 7 月和 11 月屏蔽了一系列国际社交媒体和消息应用程序，理由是它们未能遵守数据保护法中的本地化要求；到 2022 年 8 月，大多数平台的访问已恢复。2022 年 3 月，巴西 最高法院的一名法官推翻了禁止 Telegram 的命令，此前该应用程序同意删除被标记为虚假信息的内容，并宣布将任命一名当地代表。尼日利亚 官员于 2022 年 1 月取消了对 Twitter 的为期 7 个月的封锁，声称该公司已同意在该国建立实体存在。
**The future of internet freedom in “swing states”
“摇摆州”互联网自由的未来**
Countries including Brazil and Nigeria are often referred to as swing states due to their potential regional or global influence over the future of internet governance. They have oscillated between protecting and undermining human rights online, with many ranked Partly Free by Freedom on the Net. Progress in these countries could ensure the survival of a free and open internet, or they could join authoritarian powers in promoting the more closed model of cyber sovereignty. Democratic institutions in some swing states intervened to protect human rights online during the coverage period. The Indian Supreme Court ordered the government to reevaluate the country’s colonial-era sedition law, which has increasingly been used to charge online dissidents, in May 2022—even as political leaders sought to extend control over online content through problematic new legislation. Brazilian lawmakers enshrined the protection of personal data in the constitution in February 2022, a landmark action that elevated privacy rights above the whims of any government or simple legislative majority.
巴西和尼日利亚等国家通常被称为摇摆国家，因为它们对互联网治理的未来具有潜在的区域或全球影响力。他们在保护和破坏网络人权之间摇摆不定，许多人被 《网络自由》 评为“部分自由”。这些国家的进步可以确保自由开放的互联网的生存，或者它们可以与威权国家一起推动更加封闭的网络主权模式。在报道期间，一些摇摆州的民主机构进行了干预，以保护网络人权。印度最高法院于 2022 年 5 月下令政府重新评估该国殖民时代的煽动叛乱法，该法越来越多地被用来指控网络异见人士，尽管政治领导人试图通过有问题的新立法来扩大对网络内容的控制。巴西立法者于 2022 年 2 月将个人数据保护写入宪法，这是一项具有里程碑意义的行动，将隐私权置于任何政府或简单立法多数的一时兴起之上。
Progress in “swing states” could ensure the survival of a free and open internet. “摇摆州”的进步可以确保自由开放的互联网的生存。
But the decision came amid a contentious election year, in which President Jair Bolsonaro and his allies have bombarded the online space with false claims about electoral fraud. In October 2021, Kenya’s highest court paused the implementation of an expansive biometric identity-card system until it could meet appropriate standards for data protection. President Guillermo Lasso of Ecuador vetoed provisions of a law that criminalized the disclosure of secrets online in June 2021, protecting digital media outlets from a serious legal threat.
但这一决定是在充满争议的选举年做出的，总统雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗和他的盟友在网络空间上炮轰了有关选举舞弊的虚假指控。 2021 年 10 月，肯尼亚 最高法院暂停了广泛的生物识别身份证系统的实施，直到它能够满足适当的数据保护标准。厄瓜多尔 总统吉列尔莫·拉索于 2021 年 6 月否决了一项将网上泄露秘密定为刑事犯罪的法律条款，保护数字媒体免受严重的法律威胁。
Other countries in this group pursued practices that increased digital repression and undermined the diversity of the information space. In Tunisia, President Kaïs Saïed suspended parts of the constitution, imposed overly broad rules barring what the state deems to be “false” information, and oversaw the arrest of his online critics—an alarming turn for the country with the Arab world’s highest internet freedom score. Indonesian authorities briefly blocked several websites after the coverage period, including Yahoo and PayPal, to force compliance with a repressive law that requires companies to register with the government, appoint a local liaison, and remove content under tighter timelines.
该集团的其他国家采取的做法加剧了数字压制并破坏了信息空间的多样性。在 突尼斯，总统凯斯·赛义德暂停了部分宪法，实施了过于宽泛的规则，禁止国家认为“虚假”信息，并逮捕了网上批评者——对于这个阿拉伯世界互联网自由度最高的国家来说，这是一个令人震惊的转变分数。印度尼西亚 当局在报道期结束后短暂封锁了包括雅虎和 PayPal 在内的多个网站，以强制遵守一项压制性法律，该法律要求公司向政府注册、任命当地联络人并在更严格的时间内删除内容。
**The world’s most repressive online environment
世界上最压抑的网络环境**
For the eighth consecutive year, China remained the world’s worst environment for internet freedom. Content related to the 2022 Beijing Olympics and the COVID-19 pandemic remained heavily censored during the coverage period, particularly as Shanghai residents shared their experiences amid a disastrous two-month lockdown that began in April 2022. The government also intensified censorship of online content related to women’s rights and suppressed social media campaigns against sexual assault and harassment, including through the detention of tennis star Peng Shuai after she alleged on the social media platform Weibo that she was sexually assaulted by senior CCP official Zhang Gaoli. Separately, journalists, human rights activists, members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and ordinary users were detained for sharing online content, with some facing harsh prison sentences.
中国 连续第八年成为全球互联网自由环境最差的国家。在报道期间，与 2022 年北京奥运会和 COVID-19 大流行相关的内容仍然受到严格审查，特别是当上海居民分享他们在 2022 年 4 月开始的灾难性两个月封锁期间的经历时。政府还加强了对相关在线内容的审查并压制反对性侵犯和性骚扰的社交媒体运动，包括拘留网球明星彭帅，因为她在社交媒体平台微博上声称自己遭中共高官张高丽性侵。另外，记者、人权活动人士、宗教和少数民族群体成员以及普通用户因分享在线内容而被拘留，其中一些人面临严厉的监禁。
Government officials instituted new policies to tighten their control over Chinese technology companies. The main internet regulator issued guidance requiring platforms to align their content moderation and recommendation systems with “Xi Jinping Thought”—the official ideology of the current CCP leader. Another set of draft rules would impose heavy penalties on companies that enable Chinese internet users to bypass the Great Firewall. Meanwhile, the country’s data protection framework, which took effect in November 2021, established baseline safeguards for personal data held by Chinese companies—though it failed to apply the same standards to data held or requested by the government.
政府官员制定了新政策，加强对中国科技公司的控制。主要互联网监管机构发布指导意见，要求平台将其内容审核和推荐系统与“习近平思想”（现任中共领导人的官方意识形态）保持一致。另一套规则草案将对允许中国互联网用户绕过防火墙的公司处以重罚。与此同时，于 2021 年 11 月生效的中国数据保护框架为中国公司持有的个人数据建立了基线保护措施，尽管它未能对政府持有或要求的数据应用相同的标准。
**For the United States, progress abroad and stalemate at home
对于美国来说，国外进步，国内陷入僵局**
The administration of US president Joseph Biden made the promotion of internet freedom a top priority of its foreign policy. In April 2022, the White House helped bring together more than 60 governments to sign the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, a nonbinding agreement to advance a positive vision of the internet. The US State Department established its Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, helped launch the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, and revealed that it would chair the Freedom Online Coalition in 2023. Similarly, the US Agency for International Development announced an investment of up to $20 million annually to dramatically expand its digital democracy work. This flurry of activity on the global stage stood in stark contrast to the lack of movement at home. While internet freedom improved for the first time in six years, the change was marginal, and proposed laws that would strengthen human rights online and increase tech-related transparency made little progress. The continued lack of a comprehensive federal privacy law and incomplete reforms to surveillance rules have allowed government agencies to simply purchase Americans’ data from shadowy brokers with little oversight or safeguards.
美国 总统约瑟夫·拜登政府将促进互联网自由作为其外交政策的首要任务。 2022 年 4 月，白宫帮助 60 多个政府签署了《互联网未来宣言》，这是一项不具约束力的协议，旨在推进互联网的积极愿景。美国国务院成立了网络空间和数字政策局，帮助启动了出口管制和人权倡议，并透露将在 2023 年主持自由在线联盟。同样，美国国际开发署宣布投资高达每年 2000 万美元用于大幅扩展其数字民主工作。全球舞台上的这一系列活动与国内的缺乏动静形成鲜明对比。虽然互联网自由六年来首次得到改善，但这种变化是微乎其微的，而旨在加强网络人权和提高技术相关透明度的拟议法律几乎没有取得任何进展。由于持续缺乏全面的联邦隐私法和对监控规则的不完整改革，政府机构只能从影子经纪人那里购买美国人的数据，而几乎没有监督或保障。
The lack of a comprehensive privacy law and incomplete reforms to surveillance rules have allowed government agencies to simply purchase Americans’ data from shadowy brokers. 由于缺乏全面的隐私法和对监控规则的不完整改革，政府机构只能从影子经纪人那里购买美国人的数据。
The Supreme Court decision that overturned Roe v. Wade and denied a constitutional right to abortion also prompted renewed concerns about law enforcement access to location information, browsing histories, and other forms of data that could be used for criminal and civil investigations in US jurisdictions where legal access to reproductive health care is restricted.
最高法院推翻罗伊诉韦德案并否认宪法规定的堕胎权的裁决也再次引发了人们对执法部门获取位置信息、浏览历史记录以及可用于美国司法管辖区刑事和民事调查的其他形式数据的担忧。合法获得生殖保健的机会受到限制。
During the coverage period, mass denial of the outcome of the 2020 presidential election by former president Donald Trump and his supporters, driven in part by online conspiracy theories and disinformation, polluted the information environment and seeped into the broader American political system. Election deniers have leveraged online support to mount viable candidacies for public office ahead of the November 2022 midterm balloting. Disinformation about stolen elections and supposed vulnerability to fraud has fueled calls for citizens to “protect” the vote by force if necessary. Election workers and administrators have reported receiving a barrage of online threats and harassment, leading large numbers of them to resign out of fear for their own safety. In effect, such disinformation and intimidation have undermined the basic security of US electoral mechanisms, provided Republican Party leaders in many states with a false justification for new antifraud measures that could restrict access to voting or distort the counting and certification processes, and set the stage for future unrest by eroding public trust in any unfavorable results.
报道期间，前总统唐纳德·特朗普及其支持者在网络阴谋论和虚假信息的推动下大规模否认 2020 年总统选举结果，污染了信息环境并渗透到更广泛的美国政治体系。选举否认者利用在线支持，在 2022 年 11 月中期投票之前选出可行的公职候选人。有关选举被盗和容易遭受欺诈的虚假信息促使公民呼吁在必要时使用武力“保护”选票。选举工作人员和管理人员报告称，他们收到了大量的在线威胁和骚扰，导致他们中的许多人因担心自身安全而辞职。实际上，此类虚假信息和恐吓破坏了美国选举机制的基本安全，为许多州的共和党领导人提供了采取新反欺诈措施的虚假理由，这些措施可能会限制投票机会或扭曲计票和认证流程，并为新的反欺诈措施奠定了基础。通过削弱公众对任何不利结果的信任来应对未来的骚乱。
The Shattering of the Global Internet
全球互联网的崩溃
The internet is more fragmented than ever, preventing billions of people from exercising their human rights online. Authorities in over two-thirds of the countries surveyed in this report have used their legal and regulatory powers to limit access to foreign information sources, leaving residents in a domestic information space that is effectively shaped by the state. More governments are also passing legislation that places guardrails around the flow of user data across borders, with mixed consequences for the global internet and human rights. The most perilous laws purport to protect privacy even as they delegate oversight to regulators beholden to the political leadership or force data to be stored in less secure settings.
互联网比以往任何时候都更加分散，导致数十亿人无法在网上行使人权。在本报告所调查的国家中，超过三分之二的国家当局利用其法律和监管权力限制对外国信息来源的访问，使居民处于由国家有效塑造的国内信息空间中。越来越多的政府还通过立法，对用户数据的跨境流动设置护栏，这对全球互联网和人权产生了复杂的影响。最危险的法律声称要保护隐私，即使它们将监督权委托给受政治领导影响的监管机构，或迫使数据存储在不太安全的环境中。
Few if any countries have taken the extreme step of disconnecting entirely from the global internet on a technical level. But a small number of authoritarian leaders are following the CCP in reengineering their domestic networks to allow greater control over technical infrastructure. Their success remains constrained by the daunting economic and societal costs of such measures, as well as the endurance of international norms supporting an open global internet.
很少有国家采取极端措施，在技术层面上完全脱离全球互联网。但少数独裁领导人正在效仿中共，重新设计其国内网络，以更好地控制技术基础设施。它们的成功仍然受到此类措施的巨大经济和社会成本以及支持开放的全球互联网的国际规范的持久性的限制。
The myriad of national regulations and practices that contribute to fragmentation—intentionally or not—are being imposed by governments across the democratic spectrum, but there are crucial distinctions. Authoritarian regimes in countries such as China, Iran, and Russia are seeking to wall their people off from the rest of the world. More democratic measures typically seek to enforce rights-protecting legislation that addresses abusive company behavior or genuine online harms. Though accomplished through state intervention, these policies are often paired with safeguards that allow for the continued flow of information and services across borders, so long as partners ensure a similar level of protection for users’ rights.
民主领域的政府有意或无意地实施了无数导致分裂的国家法规和做法，但它们之间存在着关键的区别。中国、伊朗和俄罗斯等国家的独裁政权正在寻求将本国人民与世界其他地区隔离开来。更民主的措施通常寻求执行权利保护立法，以解决公司的滥用行为或真正的在线伤害。尽管这些政策是通过国家干预来实现的，但它们通常还配有保障措施，允许信息和服务持续跨境流动，只要合作伙伴确保对用户权利提供类似水平的保护。
**Isolating users from outside information
将用户与外部信息隔离**
In response to both real and purported threats online, authorities in at least 47 countries cut residents off from the flow of news and information across borders. Some governments alleged foreign meddling to justify new censorial regulations, while others imposed localized shutdowns of internet service, plunging users into digital darkness in a bid to suppress information about human rights abuses. In tandem with this censorship, many political leaders bolstered support for state-aligned social media platforms that are more receptive to their demands.
为了应对真实和据称的网络威胁，至少 47 个国家/地区的当局切断了居民与跨境新闻和信息流动的联系。一些政府声称外国干预是为了证明新的审查规定是合理的，而另一些政府则实行局部关闭互联网服务，使用户陷入数字黑暗，以压制有关侵犯人权的信息。在进行这种审查的同时，许多政治领导人也加强了对更容易接受他们的要求的国家联盟社交媒体平台的支持。
The restrictions were largely imposed in countries that are designated as Not Free or Partly Free by Freedom in the World, demonstrating the extent to which both entrenched and aspiring authoritarian leaders rely on information controls to retain power. It is during perilous moments of political transition and possible transformation—such as protests, elections, and conflicts—that censorship of foreign information tends to intensify.
这些限制主要是在被 《世界自由》 列为不自由或部分自由的国家实施的，这表明根深蒂固的独裁领导人和有抱负的独裁领导人在多大程度上依赖信息控制来保留权力。在政治过渡和可能发生的变革的危险时刻——例如抗议、选举和冲突——对外国信息的审查往往会加强。
***Blocking access to international websites, social media platforms, or the internet as a whole
阻止访问国际网站、社交媒体平台或整个互联网***
Authorities increasingly cut off domestic users from websites and social media platforms that serve international audiences. These national restrictions have a global impact, limiting connections to family members in other countries and the diaspora communities that use digital technologies to stay in touch with their countries of origin.
当局越来越多地切断国内用户与为国际受众提供服务的网站和社交媒体平台的联系。这些国家限制具有全球影响，限制了与其他国家的家庭成员以及使用数字技术与原籍国保持联系的侨民社区的联系。
Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has cultivated a domestic intranet to help silence opposition to its takeover and consolidate its power. Residents can only access an estimated 1,200 websites and platforms through mobile connections. Facebook and Twitter—both popular with anticoup protesters and key tools for communicating with allies abroad—remain inaccessible. The junta has also imposed shutdowns of internet service in towns across the country, often coinciding with military offensives against ethnic militias, armed prodemocracy groups, or communities that are suspected of supporting them. In practice, these restrictions have limited the sharing of evidence of human rights abuses with external audiences, forced residents to rely on military-dominated information sources, and helped to contain civic mobilization and dissent.
自 2021 年 2 月政变以来，缅甸军政府培育了一个国内内网，以帮助压制对其接管的反对声音并巩固其权力。居民只能通过移动连接访问约 1,200 个网站和平台。 Facebook 和 Twitter 都受到反政变抗议者的欢迎，也是与海外盟友沟通的关键工具，但仍然无法访问。军政府还关闭了全国城镇的互联网服务，这通常与针对少数民族民兵、武装民主团体或涉嫌支持他们的社区的军事进攻同时发生。实际上，这些限制限制了与外部受众分享侵犯人权的证据，迫使居民依赖军方主导的信息来源，并有助于遏制公民动员和异议。
In Ethiopia, internet access has been restricted in the Tigray Region since November 2020, when armed conflict broke out between the federal government and forces associated with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. The shutdown has prevented people in Tigray from sharing their stories and reporting on actions by combatants that human rights groups have described as mass atrocity crimes, limiting opportunities for accountability and global solidarity. Similarly in July 2021, as Cubans mobilized the largest antigovernment demonstrations in the country since the 1959 revolution, the authorities briefly restricted internet access and blocked WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. These steps prevented protesters from effectively using digital tools to coordinate protests, and they separated the movement from independent news outlets and Cubans based abroad, who had rallied support for the demonstrations on international social media platforms.
在埃塞俄比亚，自 2020 年 11 月联邦政府与提格雷人民解放阵线相关部队之间爆发武装冲突以来，提格雷地区的互联网访问一直受到限制。政府关闭导致提格雷人无法分享他们的故事，也无法报道战斗人员的行动，人权组织将其描述为大规模暴行，限制了追究责任和全球团结的机会。同样，2021 年 7 月，古巴人在该国发动了自 1959 年革命以来最大规模的反政府示威活动，当局短暂限制了互联网访问，并屏蔽了 WhatsApp、Telegram 和 Signal。这些步骤阻止了抗议者有效地使用数字工具来协调抗议活动，并将该运动与独立新闻媒体和国外的古巴人分开，后者在国际社交媒体平台上为示威活动集结了支持。
While the vast majority of governments that limited access to foreign content did so to maintain their own power or thwart accountability, a notable exception came from the EU. Brussels ordered each member state’s telecommunications providers to block the websites of the Russian state media services RT and Sputnik. These sites certainly promote incendiary and false content, and international human rights standards permit limits on free expression under specific circumstances including armed conflict. However, the EU’s broad ban restricted all content from these sites rather than more narrow information related to the war. It also lacked clear sunset provisions and was imposed without adequate oversight, transparency, and consultation with civil society and telecommunications companies. The EU’s insufficient clarity and specificity left companies scrambling to determine how to comply, leading to uneven blocking among member states. Furthermore, the ban set a flawed precedent for how democracies could respond to problematic information disseminated by other foreign state-owned news outlets, such as those based in Beijing.
尽管绝大多数政府限制访问外国内容是为了维持自己的权力或阻止问责，但欧盟是一个明显的例外。布鲁塞尔命令各成员国的电信提供商封锁俄罗斯国家媒体 RT 和 Sputnik 的网站。这些网站肯定宣扬煽动性和虚假内容，而国际人权标准允许在武装冲突等特定情况下限制言论自由。然而，欧盟的广泛禁令限制了这些网站的所有内容，而不是与战争相关的更狭隘的信息。它还缺乏明确的日落条款，并且在实施时没有充分的监督、透明度以及与民间社会和电信公司的协商。欧盟不够明确和具体，导致企业争先恐后地决定如何遵守，导致成员国之间的封锁不平衡。此外，该禁令为民主国家如何应对其他外国国有新闻媒体（例如总部位于北京的媒体）传播的有问题的信息树立了一个有缺陷的先例。
To track the different ways in which governments seek to dominate the digital sphere, Freedom House monitors their application of nine Key Internet Controls. The resulting data reveal trends in the expansion and diversification of these constraints on internet freedom.
为了跟踪政府寻求主导数字领域的不同方式，自由之家监控他们对九项关键互联网控制的应用。由此产生的数据揭示了这些对互联网自由的限制的扩大和多样化趋势。
***Targeting circumvention technology
针对性规避技术***
Journalists, activists, and ordinary users in many countries have flocked to circumvention tools like virtual private networks (VPNs), which allow them to use the internet safely and anonymously while bypassing some forms of state censorship. In response, governments are increasingly blocking, criminalizing, or imposing regulatory requirements on the circumvention tools themselves.
许多国家的记者、活动人士和普通用户纷纷涌向虚拟专用网络 (VPN) 等规避工具，这些工具使他们能够安全、匿名地使用互联网，同时绕过某些形式的国家审查制度。作为回应，各国政府越来越多地对规避工具本身进行封锁、定罪或施加监管要求。
Blocks on circumvention technology escalated in moments of political tension during the coverage period, when access to the uncensored international internet would have boosted those seeking to change the balance of power. During Venezuela’s November 2021 regional elections, in which opposition parties sought to challenge the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, service providers blocked VPNs and the anonymous web browser Tor, presumably on government orders, in addition to widespread blocking of international and independent Venezuelan media sites. Venezuelan internet users were cut off from critical information, particularly the reports of foreign media and election-monitoring groups.
在报道期间政治紧张的时刻，对规避技术的封锁升级，当时访问未经审查的国际互联网将促进那些寻求改变权力平衡的人。在 委内瑞拉2021 年 11 月地区选举期间，反对党试图挑战尼古拉斯·马杜罗 (Nicolás Maduro) 的独裁统治，除了广泛封锁委内瑞拉国际和独立媒体网站外，服务提供商可能是根据政府命令封锁了 VPN 和匿名网络浏览器 Tor。委内瑞拉互联网用户无法获取重要信息，特别是外国媒体和选举监督组织的报道。
In India, new regulatory requirements for VPN providers were introduced amid government censorship demands targeting US-based technology companies as well as a two-year block on communications platforms owned by China-based companies, including TikTok and WeChat. The VPN services will be required to maintain subscriber records, such as names and IP (internet protocol) addresses, for five years and furnish them to the government on request, with steep fines for noncompliance. International providers TunnelBear and Norton have since made their services unavailable in India. In nearby Myanmar, security officials have reportedly employed cruder tactics to deter people from using the technology: they have arbitrarily searched civilians’ phones for evidence of VPNs, detaining individuals who are found to have downloaded them.
印度 政府针对美国科技公司提出了审查要求，并对 TikTok 和微信等中国公司拥有的通信平台实施为期两年的封锁，因此出台了针对 VPN 提供商的新监管要求。 VPN 服务将被要求将用户记录（例如姓名和 IP（互联网协议）地址）保存五年，并根据要求向政府提供，违规者将被处以高额罚款。此后，国际提供商 TunnelBear 和 Norton 已停止在印度提供服务。据报道，在邻近的缅甸，安全官员采用了更粗暴的策略来阻止人们使用该技术：他们任意搜查平民的手机以寻找 VPN 的证据，并拘留被发现下载了 VPN 的个人。
***Exploiting fears of foreign interference to inhibit independent media
利用对外国干涉的恐惧来抑制独立媒体***
Authorities also invoked the specter of foreign interference to expand censorship of websites based abroad or those that receive foreign funding. Website owners or journalists living outside a given country often have more leeway to resist government pressure and produce unfettered reporting. By requiring websites and related companies to be based domestically or to accept only domestic funding, a state can enhance its capacity to control the local information space.
当局还以外国干涉为由，扩大对国外网站或接受外国资助的网站的审查。居住在特定国家/地区之外的网站所有者或记者通常有更多的余地来抵抗政府压力并进行不受限制的报道。通过要求网站和相关公司设在国内或仅接受国内资金，国家可以增强其控制本地信息空间的能力。
In October 2021, Singapore’s government added the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to its formidable arsenal of censorship powers. In the name of preventing foreign meddling in domestic politics, FICA authorizes officials to block websites and order social media companies and other sites to remove speech if they suspect that the content in question was influenced by a foreign actor. A regulatory body suspended the license of the citizen news site The Online Citizen within a day of the bill’s introduction in Parliament, citing concerns about foreign funding.
2021 年 10 月，新加坡 政府将《外国干涉（反措施）法》（FICA）纳入其强大的审查权力之中。以防止外国干涉国内政治的名义，FICA 授权官员封锁网站，并命令社交媒体公司和其他网站删除怀疑相关内容受到外国演员影响的言论。该法案在议会提出后一天内，监管机构就暂停了公民新闻网站 “在线公民” 的许可证，理由是担心外国资金的流入。
A restrictive Azerbaijani media law that was adopted in February 2022 limits the foreign funding that media—defined broadly to include both news outlets and individuals—can accept and requires media operators to be based in the country. The law further clamped down on what was already a tightly controlled online media environment, with many Azerbaijani journalists forced to operate from abroad to avoid state persecution.
2022 年 2 月通过的一项限制性 阿塞拜疆 媒体法限制媒体（广义上包括新闻媒体和个人）可以接受的外国资金，并要求媒体运营商必须设在该国。该法律进一步打压了本已受到严格控制的在线媒体环境，许多阿塞拜疆记者被迫在国外开展工作，以避免受到国家迫害。
***Propping up state-aligned and state-owned alternatives to international platforms
支持国家联盟和国有替代国际平台***
Even as they increased pressure on foreign platforms over the past year, many repressive governments promoted pliant domestic alternatives as part of a strategy to create a siloed and politically tamed information environment. If users migrate to state-aligned platforms, the domestic political costs of blocking international services would be reduced, facilitating further fragmentation.
尽管在过去的一年里，许多专制政府加大了对外国平台的压力，但他们还是推行了顺从的国内替代方案，作为创建孤立的、政治上驯服的信息环境的战略的一部分。如果用户迁移到国家一致的平台，阻止国际服务的国内政治成本将会降低，从而促进进一步的碎片化。
In China, the government has been fairly successful in pairing systematic censorship of foreign services with robust investment in domestic platforms that are beholden to the ruling party. A more diverse social media market, including the development of smaller and more local platforms that meet the needs of a particular community, is sorely needed around the world. But companies owned by or with close ties to authoritarian governments are more likely to censor unfavorable content and become vehicles for state disinformation than their counterparts based in more democratic contexts. These so-called parallel platforms are often less transparent in their operations and policies, and they may be better shielded from civil society advocacy, media investigations, and other forms of public scrutiny.
在 中国，政府相当成功地将对外国服务的系统性审查与对执政党负责的国内平台的大力投资结合起来。世界各地迫切需要更加多样化的社交媒体市场，包括开发更小、更本地化的平台来满足特定社区的需求。但与民主背景下的同行相比，独裁政府拥有或与独裁政府关系密切的公司更有可能审查不利内容，并成为国家虚假信息的载体。这些所谓的平行平台在运营和政策方面往往不太透明，并且可能更好地免受民间社会倡导、媒体调查和其他形式的公众监督。
Moscow’s strategy to reduce reliance on foreign social media companies includes a requirement that mobile phones carry preloaded domestic apps. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, blocks on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram drove users to VK and Odnoklassniki, both run by a parent company that is partly owned by Kremlin allies. Yandex, a popular Russian search engine and rival of Google, reportedly prioritized disinformation narratives and downgraded the search results for sites that criticized the invasion. In 2022, in a bid to win larger user bases for Russian platforms, authorities reportedly offered influencers monthly payments if they switched to RuTube and Yappy, in lieu of YouTube and TikTok, and toed the government’s editorial line.
莫斯科减少对外国社交媒体公司依赖的战略包括要求手机预装国内应用程序。 2022 年 2 月入侵乌克兰后，Facebook、Twitter 和 Instagram 上的屏蔽将用户引向了 VK 和 Odnoklassniki，这两家公司都由克里姆林宫盟友部分拥有的母公司运营。据报道，俄罗斯流行的搜索引擎、谷歌的竞争对手 Yandex 优先考虑虚假信息叙述，并降低了批评入侵的网站的搜索结果。据报道，2022 年，为了为俄罗斯平台赢得更大的用户群，当局向有影响力的人士提供每月付款，条件是他们改用 RuTube 和 Yappy，而不是 YouTube 和 TikTok，并听从政府的编辑路线。
The push toward domestic platforms often followed explicit or implicit attacks on the credibility of international platforms, further undermining trust in the global information space. In Turkey, many state agencies flocked to the WhatsApp alternative BiP in 2021, after the Meta-owned app introduced a problematic privacy policy update. BiP is owned by the mobile operator Turkcell, which the state’s sovereign wealth fund controls. The platform has a growing user base in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bahrain.
对国内平台的推动往往是在对国际平台的可信度进行明示或暗示的攻击之后，进一步破坏了对全球信息空间的信任。在 土耳其，在 Meta 旗下的应用程序 BiP 引入了有问题的隐私政策更新后，许多国家机构在 2021 年纷纷涌向 WhatsApp 的替代品 BiP。 BiP 归移动运营商 Turkcell 所有，该公司由国家主权财富基金控制。该平台在孟加拉国、印度尼西亚、巴基斯坦和巴林的用户群不断增长。
**Increasing barriers to the cross-border flow of user data
用户数据跨境流动壁垒不断增加**
In at least 23 countries covered by Freedom the Net, laws that limit where and how personal data can flow were proposed or passed during the coverage period. The affected countries span the democratic spectrum, including examples that are ranked Free, Partly Free, and Not Free by Freedom in the World. The transfer of data across jurisdictions is central to the functioning of the global internet and benefits ordinary users, including by improving internet speeds, enabling companies to provide critical services worldwide, and allowing the storage of records in the most secure data centers available.
在Freedom the Net覆盖的至少 23 个国家/地区，在覆盖期间提议或通过了限制个人数据流动地点和方式的法律。受影响的国家涵盖民主范围，包括被 《世界自由》 评为“自由”、“部分自由”和“不自由”的例子。跨司法管辖区的数据传输对于全球互联网的运作至关重要，并使普通用户受益，包括提高互联网速度，使公司能够在全球范围内提供关键服务，以及允许在最安全的数据中心存储记录。
As policymakers impose necessary privacy laws that safeguard sensitive information from commercial abuse, they may unintentionally drive fragmentation by creating a barrier between their own countries and those without similar standards. The ensuing patchwork of regulations could incentivize companies, particularly newer or smaller services, to concentrate their growth in certain countries, resulting in less diverse online ecosystems for users elsewhere.
当政策制定者实施必要的隐私法来保护敏感信息免遭商业滥用时，他们可能会在自己的国家和没有类似标准的国家之间设置障碍，从而无意中推动碎片化。随之而来的监管混乱可能会激励公司，特别是较新或规模较小的服务公司，将其增长集中在某些国家，从而导致其他地方的用户的在线生态系统的多样性降低。
The EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) permits the transfer of personal data only to jurisdictions with a sufficient level of protection in place. As more governments pursue laws that appear to align with GDPR standards, some have buried problematic obligations that either mandate domestic data storage, feature blanket exceptions for national security or state actors without safeguards, or delegate increased decision-making power to politicized regulators—all of which renders users vulnerable to government abuse despite improvements pertaining to the use of personal data for commercial purposes. Such contradictory “data washing” measures ultimately fail to strengthen privacy and further fragment the internet.
欧盟 2018 年《通用数据保护条例》(GDPR) 只允许将个人数据传输到具有足够保护水平的司法管辖区。随着越来越多的政府寻求与 GDPR 标准一致的法律，一些政府掩盖了有问题的义务，这些义务要么强制要求国内数据存储，要么对国家安全或没有保障措施的国家行为者实行全面例外，要么将更多的决策权委托给政治化监管机构——所有这些尽管在将个人数据用于商业目的方面有所改进，但这使得用户很容易受到政府的滥用。这种相互矛盾的“数据清洗”措施最终无法加强隐私并进一步分裂互联网。
In August 2021, the Chinese government passed a data protection law that regulates the commercial use of personal data, creating an important set of guarantees for the country’s billion internet users. But the law does not restrict the government’s misuse of data, and it mandates domestic data storage for some companies, opening the door to further state intrusion and exploitation and imposing additional onerous barriers on the flow of personal data.
2021 年 8 月，中国政府通过了《数据保护法》，规范个人数据的商业使用，为中国 10 亿互联网用户提供了重要保障。但该法律并没有限制政府滥用数据，它还要求一些公司在国内存储数据，这为国家进一步入侵和利用打开了大门，并对个人数据的流动设置了额外的繁重障碍。
In Rwanda, a data protection law passed in October 2021 requires companies to store data in the country unless otherwise authorized by the country’s cybersecurity regulator, rather than an independent data protection agency that is more insulated from law enforcement bodies. This localization clause leaves personal data vulnerable to abuse, particularly given that authorities have embedded agents in telecommunications companies for surveillance purposes and prosecuted dissidents based on their private messages.
在 卢旺达，2021 年 10 月通过的数据保护法要求公司在该国存储数据，除非获得该国网络安全监管机构的授权，而不是与执法机构更加隔离的独立数据保护机构。这一本地化条款使个人数据容易被滥用，特别是考虑到当局在电信公司中安插了特工以进行监视，并根据持不同政见者的私人信息起诉他们。
Though modeled on the GDPR, the United Arab Emirates’ new data protection law, in effect since January 2022, exempts government entities tasked with processing personal data from complying with baseline safeguards. While its constraints on commercial data access are welcome, the law leaves the privacy of residents at risk: authorities in the country still have sweeping powers to monitor communications and seize data from service providers.
尽管以 GDPR 为蓝本，阿拉伯联合酋长国的 新数据保护法自 2022 年 1 月起生效，使负责处理个人数据的政府实体免受基线保障措施的约束。尽管对商业数据访问的限制值得欢迎，但该法律使居民的隐私面临风险：该国当局仍然拥有广泛的权力来监控通信并从服务提供商处获取数据。
**Breaking away from global infrastructure
脱离全球基础设施**
Governments in at least seven countries, all of which are ranked Not Free in Freedom in the World, sought to centralize state control over domestic infrastructure and physically isolate their networks from the global internet during the coverage period. This form of fragmentation may be the least prevalent due to the exceptionally advanced technical and administrative capacities that it requires. It also entails considerable political will: infrastructural isolation presents economic costs to businesses operating domestically, can significantly slow down connection speeds, and deepens the risk to human rights. These challenges help explain why political leaders in countries with robust civic spaces, thriving technology sectors, and more pluralistic governance systems are less likely to impose such barriers.
至少七个国家的政府（所有这些国家都被评为“世界自由” 中的“不自由”），试图在报告期内集中国家对国内基础设施的控制，并将其网络与全球互联网进行物理隔离。这种形式的分散化可能是最不普遍的，因为它需要极其先进的技术和管理能力。它还需要相当大的政治意愿：基础设施隔离会给国内运营的企业带来经济成本，可能会显着降低连接速度，并加剧人权风险。这些挑战有助于解释为什么在拥有强大的公民空间、蓬勃发展的技术部门和更加多元化的治理体系的国家，政治领导人不太可能设置此类障碍。
The CCP and state-linked companies have cultivated the most sophisticated model of cyber isolation. Internet traffic from outside the country passes through centralized, state-controlled chokepoints, facilitating mass blocking, filtering, and surveillance. Following Beijing’s path, the Iranian government has imposed state barriers between the local infrastructure and global traffic. In July 2021, authorities introduced the User Protection Bill to bolster the country’s National Information Network, which has facilitated the restriction of access to international platforms and connections while directing users to domestic alternatives. The law would place the country’s internet gateways under the authority of a working group that includes military and intelligence agencies.
中共和与国家有联系的公司已经培育出最复杂的网络隔离模式。来自国外的互联网流量会经过集中的、国家控制的阻塞点，从而促进大规模封锁、过滤和监视。伊朗 政府效仿北京的做法，在当地基础设施和全球交通之间设置了国家壁垒。 2021 年 7 月，当局推出了《用户保护法案》，以加强该国的国家信息网络，这有助于限制对国际平台和连接的访问，同时引导用户使用国内替代方案。该法律将把该国的互联网网关置于一个包括军事和情报机构在内的工作组的管辖之下。
The Russian government hastened its own progress toward infrastructural isolation over the past year. During a series of tests in June and July 2021, authorities claimed to have successfully separated the so-called RuNet from global connections, though technical experts remain skeptical. In April 2022, following his invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin appointed an interagency commission to pursue his goal of technical isolation.
过去一年，俄罗斯 政府加快了基础设施隔离进程。在 2021 年 6 月和 7 月的一系列测试中，当局声称已成功将所谓的 RuNet 与全球连接分开，但技术专家仍持怀疑态度。 2022 年 4 月，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京 (Vladimir Putin) 入侵乌克兰后任命了一个跨部门委员会，以实现其技术隔离的目标。
The Cambodian government planned to route all international and domestic internet traffic through a single portal, dubbed the National Internet Gateway (NIG). This centralized chokepoint would allow authorities to censor content from around the world and surveil residents more easily. Cambodian officials unexpectedly delayed the NIG’s implementation in February 2022, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and issues related to licensing and equipment installation. The decision came after extensive opposition to the NIG from the private sector, civil society, and experts at the United Nations.
柬埔寨 政府计划通过一个名为国家互联网网关 (NIG) 的单一门户路由所有国际和国内互联网流量。这个集中的阻塞点将使当局能够审查来自世界各地的内容并更容易地监视居民。柬埔寨官员出人意料地于 2022 年 2 月推迟了 NIG 的实施，理由是 COVID-19 大流行以及与许可和设备安装相关的问题。这一决定是在私营部门、民间社会和联合国专家广泛反对国家信息集团之后做出的。
**The competition to control the web
控制网络的竞争**
Fragmentation at the national level is part of a global battle for control over the internet. Led by Beijing and Moscow, diplomats from authoritarian countries have promoted their model of cyber sovereignty at multilateral institutions. As secretary general of the ITU, China’s Houlin Zhao encouraged a shift of control over the setting of technical standards away from multistakeholder bodies, where civil society and other nongovernmental experts have more sway, and toward the ITU itself, where only governments have input.
国家层面的分裂是全球互联网控制权争夺战的一部分。在北京和莫斯科的带领下，威权国家的外交官在多边机构中推广其网络主权模式。作为国际电联秘书长，中国赵厚麟鼓励将技术标准制定的控制权从多利益攸关方机构（民间社会和其他非政府专家拥有更大影响力）转向国际电联本身（只有政府提供意见）。
During Zhao’s tenure, in 2019 and 2020, the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei introduced the New IP proposal, a plan to fundamentally alter the interoperability of the global internet’s infrastructure by redesigning common protocols to facilitate greater state control over domestic networks. While initially voted down by ITU members, rebranded elements of the proposal have since reemerged in standards-setting bodies. Chinese officials also launched in July 2022 the World Internet Conference International Organization in Beijing, intended to serve as a “shared” global community that would determine technical standards and governance. The organization, stemming from an annual meeting of the same name that was first held in 2014, could create a new forum in which the Chinese government can promote and incentivize other governments to adopt its authoritarian model of digital control.
在赵的任期内，即 2019 年和 2020 年，中国电信巨头华为提出了新 IP 提案，该计划通过重新设计通用协议来从根本上改变全球互联网基础设施的互操作性，以促进国家对国内网络的更大控制。虽然最初被国际电联成员否决，但该提案的更名内容后来重新出现在标准制定机构中。中国官员还于 2022 年 7 月在北京成立了世界互联网大会国际组织，旨在成为一个确定技术标准和治理的“共享”全球社区。该组织源于 2014 年首次举行的同名年会，可以创建一个新的论坛，中国政府可以在其中促进和激励其他政府采用其独裁的数字控制模式。
BEIJING, CHINA - AUGUST 31: A screen shows secretary-general of the International Telecommunication Union Zhao Houlin speaking during the opening ceremony of 2021 World 5G Convention at Beijing Etrong International Exhibition & Convention Center on August 31, 2021 in Beijing, China. (Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images)
中国北京 - 8 月 31 日：屏幕显示国际电信联盟秘书长赵厚麟于 2021 年 8 月 31 日在中国北京北京亦创国际会展中心举行的 2021 年世界 5G 大会开幕式上发表讲话。 （图片来源：VCG/VCG，盖蒂图片社）
The Russian government has similarly leveraged international institutions to influence internet governance. At the United Nations in February 2022, negotiations began for a new cybercrime treaty, which was initially proposed by Russian diplomats and cosponsored by representatives from Belarus, Cambodia, China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all ranked Not Free by Freedom in the World. Civil society has resoundingly condemned the proposed treaty as a new vector for digital repression. Moscow also joined Beijing in June 2021 to call for a more powerful ITU and endorse the right of each state to control its own “national segment of the internet.” One Russian official explained the need for a more forceful version of the agency by claiming that the multistakeholder model of governance was “ineffective.”
俄罗斯政府也同样利用国际机构来影响互联网治理。 2022 年 2 月，联合国开始了一项新的网络犯罪条约的谈判，该条约最初由俄罗斯外交官提出，白俄罗斯、柬埔寨、中国、朝鲜、缅甸、尼加拉瓜和委内瑞拉的代表共同发起，这些国家均被列为“不因自由而自由”在世界上。民间社会强烈谴责拟议的条约，称其为数字镇压的新载体。莫斯科还于 2021 年 6 月与北京一起呼吁建立更强大的国际电联，并支持每个国家控制自己的“国家互联网部分”的权利。一位俄罗斯官员解释说，该机构需要一个更有力的版本，他声称多利益相关者的治理模式“无效”。
***Democratic states step up globally
民主国家在全球范围内崛起***
Some democratic leaders have revived efforts to shape global digital standards that uphold fundamental freedoms, creating a much-needed counterweight to authoritarian efforts. After allowing ITU secretary general Zhao to run unopposed in 2014 and 2018, Washington nominated Doreen Bogdan-Martin to seek the post, and she defeated a candidate backed by Moscow in a September 2022 vote by member states. Two US-led initiatives, the Summit for Democracy and the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, have sought to solidify common norms as a basis for further action. Moreover, the United States has pledged to strengthen and expand the Freedom Online Coalition in its upcoming role as chair in 2023.
一些民主领导人重新努力制定维护基本自由的全球数字标准，为独裁努力提供急需的制衡力量。在允许国际电联秘书长赵紫阳在 2014 年和 2018 年无对手竞选后，华盛顿提名多琳·博格丹 - 马丁竞选这一职位，她在 2022 年 9 月的成员国投票中击败了莫斯科支持的候选人。美国主导的两项倡议——民主峰会和互联网未来宣言——寻求巩固共同规范，作为进一步行动的基础。此外，美国承诺在 2023 年担任主席期间加强和扩大自由在线联盟。
Greater policy coordination among democracies is vital to the protection of a free and open internet. 民主国家之间加强政策协调对于保护自由开放的互联网至关重要。
Across the Atlantic, the EU and its member states have taken similar action. The Copenhagen Pledge on Tech and Democracy, led by the Danish government, uses a multistakeholder format by inviting governments, multilateral bodies, civil society, and the private sector together to protect human rights in the digital age. Separately, the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) is a promising alternative to more censorial regulatory approaches and could serve as a global model. It strengthens transparency, limits advertising systems, and requires large platforms to provide data to independent researchers and organizations, which can then lead to more innovative and effective responses to online harms. The DSA also institutes a more inclusive coregulatory form of oversight and enforcement, including by using independent third-party auditors to review compliance, which can limit the risk of abuse.
在大西洋彼岸，欧盟及其成员国也采取了类似的行动。由丹麦政府牵头的《哥本哈根技术与民主承诺》采用多利益相关方形式，邀请各国政府、多边机构、民间社会和私营部门共同保护数字时代的人权。另外，欧盟的数字服务法案（DSA）是审查性更强的监管方法的一个有前途的替代方案，可以作为全球模式。它增强了透明度，限制了广告系统，并要求大型平台向独立研究人员和组织提供数据，从而可以对在线危害采取更具创新性和更有效的应对措施。 DSA 还制定了更具包容性的监督和执行核心监管形式，包括使用独立的第三方审计师来审查合规性，这可以限制滥用的风险。
However, the DSA framework features a problematic “notice-and-action” provision for companies to remove speech that is deemed illegal by EU authorities or member states, which could be abused to silence political, social, and religious speech. To limit this risk, Brussels and member states should clearly define and harmonize their definitions of what constitutes “illegal” speech in keeping with international law, and ensure that independent judicial authorities oversee any removal of content.
然而，DSA 框架有一个有问题的“通知和行动”条款，要求公司删除被欧盟当局或成员国视为非法的言论，这些言论可能被滥用来压制政治、社会和宗教言论。为了限制这种风险，布鲁塞尔和成员国应根据国际法明确定义和协调“非法”言论的定义，并确保独立的司法机构监督任何内容的删除。
***Harmonizing data protection to create a race to the top
协调数据保护以创造竞争优势***
Greater policy coordination among democracies is vital to the protection of a free and open internet. In a promising sign from April 2022, the governments of Canada, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States established the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Forum to bridge regulatory discrepancies and promote the free flow of data under what it determines as “best practices” for data protection. The EU and the United States also made progress during the coverage period following the European Court of Justice’s invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield framework in 2020, a ruling that limited transatlantic data flows due to concerns about US national security surveillance programs. In March 2022, the transatlantic partners announced an agreement on Privacy Shield 2.0, set to be formalized in late 2022, that includes a redress mechanism for EU residents who are concerned about privacy violations as well as new privacy commitments by US intelligence agencies.
民主国家之间加强政策协调对于保护自由开放的互联网至关重要。 2022 年 4 月，加拿大、日本、菲律宾、新加坡、韩国、台湾和美国政府建立了全球跨境隐私规则论坛，以弥合监管差异并促进数据自由流动，这是一个有希望的迹象。它确定的数据保护“最佳实践”。继欧洲法院于 2020 年宣布欧盟 - 美国隐私护盾框架无效后，欧盟和美国在覆盖期内也取得了进展，该裁决因对美国国家安全监控计划的担忧而限制了跨大西洋数据流。 2022 年 3 月，跨大西洋合作伙伴宣布了一项关于隐私盾 2.0 的协议，该协议将于 2022 年底正式生效，其中包括针对担心隐私侵犯的欧盟居民的补救机制，以及美国情报机构的新隐私承诺。
Governments also proposed, passed, or began enforcement of data protection laws that are compatible with rights-respecting provisions from existing international frameworks, a practice that can minimize the effects of fragmentation. South Africa’s data protection law, which entered into full force in July 2021, was drafted to harmonize with parts of the GDPR, as was Sri Lanka’s, which passed in March 2022. Both laws put limits on the transfer of personal data across borders except in certain cases, including transfers to a country with adequate safeguards. Protecting privacy does not necessarily require limiting the physical location of data storage. For instance, the proposed American Data Privacy and Protection Act in the United States avoids focusing on where data can be transferred and instead adopts a data minimization approach that limits what can be collected, how it can be stored, and with whom it can be shared.
各国政府还提议、通过或开始执行与现有国际框架中尊重权利的条款相一致的数据保护法，这种做法可以最大限度地减少碎片化的影响。南非的 数据保护法于 2021 年 7 月全面生效，其起草目的是为了与 GDPR 的部分内容保持一致，斯里兰卡的 数据保护法于 2022 年 3 月通过。这两项法律都对个人数据跨境传输进行了限制，但以下情况除外某些情况下，包括转移到有充分保障的国家。保护隐私并不一定需要限制数据存储的物理位置。例如，美国 拟议的《美国数据隐私和保护法案》避免关注数据可以转移到哪里，而是采用数据最小化方法，限制可以收集的内容、如何存储以及与谁共享。
**Resisting internet fragmentation while protecting human rights
抵制互联网碎片化，保护人权**
The values of human rights and open societies are mutually reinforcing. When implementing rights-protecting laws, governments should seek to reduce friction by coordinating their efforts across borders and aligning them with international frameworks whenever possible. Ultimately, democratic officials, technology companies, and global civil society groups should aim to empower individuals to play a greater role in making online spaces more free, secure, and inclusive. This is the best way to ensure that human rights are upheld in the digital age.
人权和开放社会的价值观是相辅相成的。在实施权利保护法律时，各国政府应通过协调跨境努力并尽可能与国际框架保持一致来减少摩擦。最终，民主官员、科技公司和全球民间社会团体应致力于赋予个人权力，让他们在使网络空间更加自由、安全和包容方面发挥更大的作用。这是确保数字时代维护人权的最佳方式。
A Resilient Internet for a More Democratic Future
一个有弹性的互联网，一个更加民主的未来
Twenty-six countries experienced net improvements in internet freedom over the past year, the highest such figure since the inception of Freedom on the Net. Though digital repression is undoubtedly becoming more sophisticated and entrenched into everyday life, responses from governments, civil society, and the private sector are beginning to yield results.
过去一年，26 个国家的互联网自由度出现净改善，这是自网络自由推出以来的最高数字。尽管数字镇压无疑变得更加复杂并根深蒂固地融入日常生活，但政府、民间社会和私营部门的应对措施已开始产生成果。
Freedom on the Net has identified proven strategies that marshal the structures, tools, and expertise necessary to prevent or address illiberal uses of technology by both domestic and foreign actors, as well as the broader societal harms that the internet often exacerbates. Some strategies provide short-term responses to instances of repression, while others build long-term mechanisms for accountability, governance, and oversight that can stave off the advance of authoritarianism over time. These approaches vary in effectiveness depending on a country’s political context: building digital resilience in a backsliding democracy and doing so under an entrenched authoritarian regime involve different sets of challenges. Collectively, however, such efforts have the potential to reverse the global decline of internet freedom. 网络自由已经确定了经过验证的战略，这些战略整合了必要的结构、工具和专业知识，以防止或解决国内外行为者对技术的不自由使用，以及互联网经常加剧的更广泛的社会危害。一些战略对镇压事件提供短期反应，而另一些战略则建立问责、治理和监督的长期机制，可以随着时间的推移阻止威权主义的发展。这些方法的有效性因国家的政治背景而异：在倒退的民主国家中建立数字弹性和在根深蒂固的独裁政权中建立数字弹性涉及不同的挑战。然而，总的来说，这些努力有可能扭转全球互联网自由的衰落。
While success requires the participation of a range of actors, civil society has always been at the forefront. Nonprofit organizations, media groups, and human rights defenders with roots in a given country or region have played a leading role in first identifying and raising awareness of a problem, often tirelessly over years, and then creating a strategy to address it, with assistance from others who can organize the requisite financial and political resources. Governments, philanthropic foundations, private companies, and others with an interest in cultivating a free and open internet that works for all of its users should do their utmost to meaningfully engage with civil society groups that are involved in the fight against digital repression and internet fragmentation, providing funding, technical expertise, capacity building, and other support to advance their work.
虽然成功需要一系列参与者的参与，但民间社会始终处于最前沿。扎根于特定国家或地区的非营利组织、媒体团体和人权捍卫者在首先发现问题并提高人们对问题的认识方面发挥了主导作用，通常多年来不知疲倦地进行，然后在来自其他国家或地区的协助下制定解决该问题的战略。其他能够组织必要的财政和政治资源的人。政府、慈善基金会、私营公司和其他有兴趣培育适合所有用户的自由开放互联网的机构应尽最大努力与参与反对数字压制和互联网碎片化的民间社会团体进行有意义的接触，提供资金、技术专长、能力建设和其他支持来推进他们的工作。
**Working with the judiciary
与司法部门合作**
In at least 28 countries covered by this report, courts protected internet freedom. In many cases, problematic laws were struck down, creating precedents to guide future state actions. Court intervention appears to be the most effective at fighting censorship and surveillance in countries ranked Free or Partly Free by Freedom in the World, where judicial authorities remain independent from or somewhat resistant to political control. Efforts to protect internet freedom should prioritize strengthening the independence of courts and building their capacity to parse the legal and technical concepts that arise in cases involving human rights online.
在本报告涵盖的至少 28 个国家中，法院保护互联网自由。在许多情况下，有问题的法律被废除，创造了指导未来国家行动的先例。在《世界自由》 排名为“自由”或“部分自由”的国家中，法院干预似乎是对抗审查和监视最有效的方法，这些国家的司法当局仍然独立于政治控制或在某种程度上抵制政治控制。保护互联网自由的努力应优先加强法院的独立性，并建设法院解析涉及网络人权案件中出现的法律和技术概念的能力。
In one positive example, the Zambian human rights organization Chapter One Foundation sued the country’s communications regulator after it blocked social media platforms during the August 2021 presidential election. As a result of the legal action, the regulator signed a consent agreement, pledging not to act outside its legal authority and making a commitment to strengthen transparency regarding any future restrictions on telecommunications platforms.
一个积极的例子是，赞比亚 人权组织第一章基金会在该国通信监管机构在 2021 年 8 月总统选举期间封锁社交媒体平台后对该国通信监管机构提起诉讼。采取法律行动后，监管机构签署了一份同意协议，承诺不会在其法定权限之外采取行动，并承诺加强未来对电信平台的任何限制的透明度。
In India, multiple civil society and media groups engaged in strategic litigation in response to the government’s censorial Information Technology Rules, and in August 2021 a court halted the enforcement of problematic provisions in the regulations as part of a suit filed by an organization representing broadcasters. In a more recent case, Mexico’s Supreme Court invalidated a biometric mobile-phone registry in April 2022, strengthening people’s ability to communicate anonymously online. The decision came after civil society activists argued that the registry facilitated widespread surveillance, made personal data less secure, and contributed to social inequalities.
在 印度，多个民间社会和媒体团体针对政府的审查信息技术规则展开了战略诉讼，2021 年 8 月，作为代表广播公司的组织提起诉讼的一部分，法院中止了法规中存在问题的条款的执行。在最近的一个案例中，墨西哥 最高法院于 2022 年 4 月宣布生物识别手机登记无效，从而增强了人们在线匿名交流的能力。这一决定是在民间社会活动人士认为登记系统促进了广泛的监视、降低个人数据的安全性并加剧社会不平等之后作出的。
**Pushing the private sector into action
推动私营部门采取行动**
In at least 30 countries over the past year, the private sector moved to protect internet freedom. In many cases, technology companies acted in response to civil society pressure, whistleblower testimony, and media scrutiny. Such cajoling can be necessary, as private-sector efforts to protect internet freedom have been inconsistent and affected by competing demands—including the mass collection of user data that forms the core business model of international social media platforms.
过去一年，至少有 30 个国家的私营部门采取行动保护互联网自由。在许多情况下，科技公司采取行动是为了应对民间社会的压力、举报人的证词和媒体的审查。这种哄骗可能是必要的，因为私营部门保护互联网自由的努力不一致，并受到相互竞争的需求的影响——包括构成国际社交媒体平台核心商业模式的大量用户数据收集。
Following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, tech companies scrambled to protect vulnerable users and avoid inadvertent support for a war of aggression. Google, Twitter, and Meta all limited the ability of Russian state media to monetize content across their platforms. They also rolled out new safety features to reduce online risks, such as Meta’s expansion of end-to-end encryption for Instagram users in Russia and Ukraine and its introduction of ephemeral messages on the Messenger application for those in Ukraine. Twitter launched a Tor Onion service, allowing users in Russia to access the platform safely and anonymously after it was blocked by the government.
克里姆林宫入侵乌克兰后，科技公司争先恐后地保护弱势用户，避免无意中支持侵略战争。谷歌、推特和 Meta 都限制了俄罗斯官方媒体通过其平台内容货币化的能力。他们还推出了新的安全功能来降低在线风险，例如 Meta 为 俄罗斯 和 乌克兰的Instagram 用户扩展了端到端加密，以及为乌克兰的 Messenger 应用程序引入了临时消息。 Twitter 推出了 Tor Onion 服务，允许俄罗斯用户在该平台被政府封锁后安全、匿名地访问该平台。
Under public pressure, social media companies have pushed back on the Indian government’s efforts to increase control over online speech. After broad condemnation from civil society about its compliance with state censorship, Twitter resisted government orders to restrict content, including posts from Freedom House, before finally acquiescing in June 2022 after a company employee was threatened with criminal charges. Twitter then took the case to the judiciary, filing a lawsuit in July 2022 that could rein in the government’s broad assertion of censorship powers.
在公众压力下，社交媒体公司抵制了印度政府加强对网络言论控制的努力。在受到民间社会对其遵守国家审查制度的广泛谴责后，Twitter 抵制了政府限制内容（包括自由之家的帖子）的命令，最终在 2022 年 6 月在一名公司员工受到刑事指控威胁后默许。 Twitter 随后将此案提交司法部门，并于 2022 年 7 月提起诉讼，此举可能会限制政府广泛行使的审查权。
The private sector has sometimes partnered with civil society, government actors, and academia to design innovative responses to online harms. In Taiwan, which faces a barrage of disinformation that can be traced to China, the popular Japan-based messaging application Line worked with civil society groups to develop a tool for users to report false information when it trends on the platform. The Taiwanese government launched a similar coordination effort following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, aiming to track war-related disinformation emanating from China.
私营部门有时与民间社会、政府行为者和学术界合作，设计针对网络危害的创新应对措施。在面临大量可追溯到中国的虚假信息的 台湾，流行的日本消息应用程序 Line 与民间社会团体合作开发了一种工具，供用户在平台上出现虚假信息时举报。在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，台湾政府发起了类似的协调行动，旨在追踪来自中国的与战争相关的虚假信息。
Civil society has played a leading role in first raising awareness of a problem and then creating a strategy to address it. 民间社会在首先提高对问题的认识，然后制定解决该问题的战略方面发挥了主导作用。
**Driving government policy changes to restore internet freedom
推动政府政策变化以恢复互联网自由**
Policymakers, regulatory bodies, and other government agencies in at least 26 countries took steps to protect human rights online during the coverage period. These measures strengthened institutional safeguards for free expression, access to information, and privacy, and defended internet users from manipulative corporate practices. In some cases, government officials were reacting to targeted advocacy campaigns by civil society organizations; in others, their actions were an indirect outcome of long-term civil society efforts to shape the public discourse about policy and regulatory responses to disinformation, harassment, corporate malfeasance, and other harms online.
在报道期间，至少有 26 个国家的政策制定者、监管机构和其他政府机构采取了措施保护网络人权。这些措施加强了对言论自由、信息获取和隐私的制度保障，并保护互联网用户免受公司操纵行为的侵害。在某些情况下，政府官员是对民间社会组织有针对性的宣传活动做出反应；在另一些情况下，他们的行动是民间社会长期努力的间接结果，这些努力旨在塑造公众关于针对虚假信息、骚扰、企业渎职行为和其他网络危害的政策和监管反应的讨论。
The Gambian government enacted legislation in July 2021 that affirmed a right to access public information, empowering journalists, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens to hold the government accountable for its performance. The law was drafted using a multistakeholder model, with Gambian and international civil society and the private sector providing input.
冈比亚 政府于 2021 年 7 月颁布立法，确认获取公共信息的权利，赋予记者、民间社会组织和普通公民让政府对其绩效负责的权利。该法律是采用多利益相关者模式起草的，冈比亚和国际民间社会以及私营部门提供了意见。
In Armenia, domestic and international civil society groups combined public condemnation with private advocacy to persuade the government to repeal a criminal defamation clause that was originally passed in July 2021. The legislation, which criminalized serious insults of government officials and public figures, was invoked throughout the year to prosecute users who shared critical commentary, especially about Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Civil society activists aired their concerns in private meetings with diplomats and in Armenian news outlets, and their objections were then cited in a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court. Government officials agreed to exclude the provision from a new criminal code that took effect in July 2022, and committed to broad consultation with nongovernmental groups when developing media-related laws in the future.
在 亚美尼亚，国内和国际民间社会团体将公开谴责与私人倡导相结合，说服政府废除最初于 2021 年 7 月通过的刑事诽谤条款。该立法将严重侮辱政府官员和公众人物的行为定为刑事犯罪，自始至终都被援引。今年是起诉那些发表批评性评论的用户的一年，尤其是对总理尼科尔·帕辛扬 (Nikol Pashinyan) 的评论。民间社会活动人士在与外交官的私下会议和亚美尼亚新闻媒体中表达了他们的担忧，然后他们的反对意见在向宪法法院提出的正式上诉中被引用。政府官员同意将该条款从 2022 年 7 月生效的新刑法中排除，并承诺在未来制定媒体相关法律时与非政府团体进行广泛磋商。
Civil society called on democratic policymakers to ensure that the sanctions they imposed in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine did not impede critical internet access. In a March 2022 letter, more than 35 internet freedom groups and experts, including Freedom House, alerted President Biden to the dangers and unintended consequences of restricting internet services for users in Russia and Belarus. Weeks later, the Treasury Department exempted telecommunications services from US sanctions related to the invasion.
民间社会呼吁民主决策者确保他们针对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰而实施的制裁不会阻碍关键的互联网接入。在 2022 年 3 月的一封信中，包括自由之家在内的超过 35 个互联网自由组织和专家提醒拜登总统注意限制俄罗斯和 白俄罗斯 用户互联网服务的危险和意想不到的后果。几周后，美国财政部免除了电信服务与入侵相关的美国制裁。
Independent regulators sought guidance from civil society and other experts on how best to prevent companies from undermining the rights of internet users. In August 2022, after the coverage period, the US Federal Trade Commission announced that it was accepting advice from the public about whether new rules were needed to protect US residents from corporate data collection. Such rules could allow the regulator to mitigate harms in the absence of comprehensive privacy protections under federal law.
独立监管机构向民间社会和其他专家寻求指导，以了解如何最好地防止公司损害互联网用户的权利。 2022 年 8 月，覆盖期结束后，美国联邦贸易委员会宣布正在接受公众关于是否需要制定新规则来保护美国居民免受公司数据收集的建议。此类规则可以让监管机构在联邦法律缺乏全面隐私保护的情况下减轻损害。
NAIROBI, KENYA - 2022/08/15: Kenyans watch the announcement of the presidential results on the phone at the Gikomba market in Nairobi. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) chairman declared Deputy President William Ruto the winner after a tight presidential race.
肯尼亚内罗毕 - 2022 年 8 月 15 日：肯尼亚人在内罗毕的 Gikomba 市场上通过电话观看总统选举结果的公布。经过激烈的总统竞选，独立选举和边界委员会（IEBC）主席宣布副总统威廉·鲁托获胜。
**Progress on Internet Shutdowns
互联网关闭的进展**
Internet shutdowns have long been a core tactic of digital repression. But this may be changing: the Freedom on the Net subscore pertaining to government restrictions on internet connectivity improved in 13 countries, the largest number of gains for a single indicator across the 21-question methodology this year. During the coverage period, governments in 14 of the 70 countries assessed shut off or throttled fixed or mobile internet services, compared with 20 countries in the report’s 2021 edition and 22 in the 2020 edition. In countries where shutdowns continue to occur, they appear to be more localized and temporary, affecting fewer people for less time than past restrictions.
长期以来，关闭互联网一直是数字压制的核心策略。但这种情况可能正在发生变化：与政府对互联网连接的限制有关的网络自由分项得分在 13 个国家有所改善，这是今年 21 个问题方法中单个指标得分最高的。在报告覆盖期间，70 个国家中有 14 个国家的政府评估了关闭或限制固定或移动互联网服务的情况，而报告 2021 年版中有 20 个国家，2020 年版中有 22 个国家。在继续发生封锁的国家，封锁似乎更加局部化和暂时性，与过去的限制相比，影响的人数更少，时间更短。
The trend suggests that a multipronged effort including strategic litigation, evidence-based research, multilateral and bilateral engagement, and targeted advocacy has helped to change the behavior of governments imposing shutdowns. For instance, researchers have illustrated that shutdowns take a toll on local economies, and they have been shown to correlate with higher levels of violence, undermining the argument that they are necessary to maintain peace and security. Lawsuits filed by civil society groups, journalists, and others have led to judicial interventions against connectivity restrictions, most recently in India in 2022 and Sudan in 2021.
这一趋势表明，包括战略诉讼、循证研究、多边和双边参与以及有针对性的宣传在内的多管齐下的努力有助于改变政府实施封锁的行为。例如，研究人员已经证明，停工对当地经济造成了损害，而且事实证明，停工与暴力程度上升有关，从而削弱了停工对于维持和平与安全所必需的论点。民间社会团体、记者和其他人提起的诉讼导致针对连接限制的司法干预，最近一次是 2022 年在印度和 2021 年在苏丹。
Disproportionate surveillance remains one of the most obvious problems affecting democracies’ internet freedom performance. 不成比例的监视仍然是影响民主国家互联网自由表现的最明显问题之一。
Proactive advocacy aimed at both governments and internet service providers has succeeded in preventing possible shutdowns ahead of major events. For instance, members of the KeepItOn coalition—comprising more than 280 civil society groups, including Freedom House, and led by the digital rights group Access Now—mobilized ahead of Kenya’s general elections in August 2022 and Iraq’s parliamentary elections in October 2021 to urge officials to maintain connectivity. Kenyan officials fulfilled their public commitments to refrain from restricting internet access, and no disruptions to internet access were reported in Iraq, unlike during the 2018 elections.
针对政府和互联网服务提供商的积极倡导已成功防止重大事件发生前可能发生的关闭。例如，#KeepItOn 联盟由包括自由之家在内的 280 多个民间社会团体组成，由数字权利组织 Access Now 领导，在 2022 年 8 月肯尼亚大选和 2021 年 10 月 伊拉克 议会选举之前动员起来，敦促官员保持连通性。肯尼亚 官员履行了不限制互联网接入的公开承诺，与 2018 年选举期间不同，伊拉克没有出现互联网接入中断的报道。
This sustained advocacy has contributed to a consensus at the multilateral level that shutdowns are unjustifiable and disproportionate. A UN report, commissioned by the Human Rights Council and released in 2022 to the General Assembly, incorporated civil society and private-sector input to outline recommendations on how to limit such censorship. The Freedom Online Coalition called for the immediate end of shutdowns in July 2021, launching an internet shutdown task force to design best practices for advocacy. The Group of Seven governments also publicly agreed in 2021 to cooperate in opposition to shutdowns when they are “politically motivated,” although they reportedly softened their language after objections from the Indian government, a global leader in connectivity restrictions.
这种持续的倡导促成了多边层面的共识，即关闭是不合理且不成比例的。受人权理事会委托并于 2022 年向联合国大会发布的一份联合国报告纳入了民间社会和私营部门的意见，概述了如何限制此类审查制度的建议。自由在线联盟呼吁在 2021 年 7 月立即结束关闭，并成立了一个互联网关闭工作组来设计宣传的最佳实践。七国集团政府还于 2021 年公开同意在“出于政治动机”时合作反对关闭，尽管据报道在印度政府（全球连通限制方面的领导者）的反对后，他们的措辞软化了。
**The path to stronger rights protections and a more resilient internet
通往更强有力的权利保护和更具弹性的互联网之路**
The success of the collective effort against service shutdowns offers a model for tackling other critical problems that are driving digital repression and the fragmentation of the open internet. Strategies that build on the work of civil society to mobilize change in the courts, among governments, and at tech firms can yield better protections for human rights online on both a national and a global scale, particularly when they enlist multilateral and multistakeholder institutions. Without such campaigns, however, the internet is likely to grow more splintered, obstructing the exchange of diverse views and innovative ideas, constraining people’s ability to organize for political and social causes, and severing cross-border connections between communities.
反对服务关闭的集体努力的成功为解决其他导致数字压制和开放互联网碎片化的关键问题提供了一个模型。以民间社会工作为基础，动员法院、政府和科技公司进行变革的战略可以在国家和全球范围内更好地保护网络人权，特别是当它们争取到多边和多利益相关方机构时。然而，如果没有这样的运动，互联网可能会变得更加分裂，阻碍不同观点和创新思想的交流，限制人们为政治和社会事业而组织起来的能力，并切断社区之间的跨境联系。
One advocacy effort has already identified its target: governments’ purchase and deployment of intrusive commercial surveillance tools that violate the rights of internet users around the world. Technical researchers, human rights experts, and media investigations have recently documented the reach and abuses of the shadowy spyware industry, and governments have started to explore legal and regulatory restrictions on the sale of such products. These are welcome first steps, but more is needed.
一项倡导工作已经确定了其目标：政府购买和部署侵犯世界各地互联网用户权利的侵入性商业监控工具。技术研究人员、人权专家和媒体调查最近记录了秘密间谍软件行业的影响范围和滥用行为，各国政府已开始探索对此类产品销售的法律和监管限制。这些都是受欢迎的第一步，但还需要更多。
Disproportionate surveillance remains one of the most obvious problems affecting democracies’ internet freedom performance. Too often, rights considerations are disregarded in favor of the misguided belief that more intrusive tools and greater state access to data will necessarily contribute to a safer society. In addition to addressing the proliferation of spyware, democracies should impose robust controls on other forms of surveillance and protect end-to-end encryption, which limits the impact of such excessive monitoring. The coalition model for achieving digital resilience could be employed to focus much-needed public scrutiny on the question of which surveillance tools and practices are compatible with human rights. Such action would lay the groundwork for democracies to adopt rights-based regulations at home, clear the way for more coordinated and effective restrictions on the private surveillance market, and remove powerful and ever-evolving monitoring tools from the hands of abusive government actors, ultimately fostering a more democratic future.
不成比例的监视仍然是影响民主国家互联网自由表现的最明显问题之一。很多时候，权利考虑被忽视，而被错误的信念所吸引，即更多的侵入性工具和更多的国家对数据的访问必然有助于建立一个更安全的社会。除了解决间谍软件扩散问题之外，民主国家还应该对其他形式的监视实施强有力的控制，并保护端到端加密，从而限制此类过度监视的影响。可以采用实现数字弹性的联盟模式，将急需的公众监督集中在哪些监控工具和做法与人权相容的问题上。此类行动将为民主国家在国内采用基于权利的法规奠定基础，为对私人监控市场进行更加协调和有效的限制扫清道路，并最终从滥用权力的政府行为者手中消除强大且不断发展的监控工具促进更加民主的未来。